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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EIGHTH
AMENDMENT BARS EXECUTION OF THE INSANE. Ford v. Wainwright,
106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
A Florida state court convicted Alvin Bernard Ford of murder in
1974 and sentenced him to die. At the time of the trial, Ford appeared
to be mentally competent. After sentencing, he began to manifest
mental and behavioral changes. Ford's counsel requested psychiatric
examination of Ford. One of the two examiners determined that Ford
was not competent to suffer execution. Counsel then invoked a Florida
statute that provided for a determination of a condemned prisoner's
competency.1
Pursuant to the statute, the Governor of Florida appointed three
psychiatrists to examine Ford. Each examined Ford at the same time
for thirty minutes. The psychiatrists reached different diagnoses, but all
three concluded that Ford was competent to suffer execution. Defense
counsel submitted to the Governor the reports of the two psychiatrists
who had previously examined Ford. The Governor then signed a death
warrant without mention of his considerations.'
Defense counsel requested a hearing in state court to redetermine
Ford's competency, but was unsuccessful.8 He then petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, seeking an evidentiary hearing on Ford's
competency. The district court denied the request without a hearing.'
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985) provides in relevant part:
(1) When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may be
insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of three psy-
chiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the psychiatrists
in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to determine whether he un-
derstands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon
him. The examination of the convicted person shall take place with all three psychia-
trists present at the same time . ...
(2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the con-
victed person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and
the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a warrant to the warden di-
recting him to execute the sentence at a time designated in the warrant.
2. It was unclear whether the Governor had considered Ford's two previous examinations.
3. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1984).
4. The district court's opinion was not published.
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probable cause and stayed Ford's execution.' The United States Su-
preme Court rejected the state's effort to vacate the stay of execution.6
After addressing the merits of Ford's claim, a divided court of appeals
affirmed the district court's denial of the writ.7 Having concluded that
the diagnoses of sanity were not conclusive, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that execution of the insane constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment which is barred by the eighth amendment. Ford v.
Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
As early as 1879, the Supreme Court ruled that public execution
was not prohibited by the eighth amendment.' In In re Kemmler? the
Court held that punishment of death by electrocution was constitution-
ally permissible. 10
Almost one hundred years after the Supreme Court first upheld
the constitutionality of the death penalty, it was challenged again in
Furman v. Georgia."' In a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the
Court held that the defendants could not be executed constitutionally
under either the Georgia or Texas statutes involved. 2 The 5-4 split re-
sulted in nine separate opinions, covering 230 pages of the United
States Reports, with none of the justices joining in the opinion of any
other.1 8 This decision effectively invalidated all death penalty statutes
in effect at the time.
Four years later, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia." Although
there was no majority opinion, the thrust of the decision was that the
punishment of death does not violate the eighth amendment in all cir-
cumstances.15 Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court
and stated that a carefully drafted statute that satisfies the concerns of
Furman"6 may be constitutional.17 Although the rule of Gregg is un-
5. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984).
6. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
7. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
8. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
9. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
10. Id. at 447.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Id. at 239-40.
13. See Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV.
1 for an analysis of the opinions.
14. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
15. Id. at 169.
16. Justice Stewart believed that the concern of Furman was "centered on those defendants
who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily." 428 U.S. at 206.
17. 428 U.S. at 195.
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clear, seven members of the Court18 affirmed the Georgia death penalty
procedure. Briefly, that procedure required (1) a bifurcated trial;19 (2)
a presentence hearing; 20 (3) a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
at least one of ten aggravating circumstances specified in the statutes
existed;2 (4) an automatic appeal, in which the state's highest court
was to determine that the sentence was not imposed under any arbi-
trary factors;22 and (5) the decision by the state's highest court was to
include references to similar cases that the court took into
consideration.2
Later decisions served to establish the boundaries of the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty. Since Gregg, the Court has found the
death penalty unconstitutional when it was imposed mandatorily for
first degree murder, which included any murder committed in perpe-
trating or attempting to perpetrate a felony.a4 The penalty was over-
turned in cases in which mitigating factors were not considered as to a
murder of a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his du-
ties.25 The death sentence has also been decreed unconstitutional as to
a person convicted of rape26 or a person who aids and abets a felony in
the course of which a murder is committed by others, but who does not
himself kill.27
The relationship between the death penalty and insane persons has
its roots in English common law. At common law, the rule was that
insane persons should not be executed.28 There are several reasons for
18. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Stewart, and
White.
19. For text of 1973 Ga. Laws 162 see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 209 n.2 (1976).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 197 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975) (codified as amended at §
17-10-30(c)(1982)).
22. Id. at 204 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975) (codified as amended at §
17-10-35 (a) and (c)(1982)).
23. Id. at 204 n.56 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(e) (Supp. 1975) (codified as amended
at § 17-10-35(e)(1982)).
24. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
25. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
26. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
27. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
28. 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (1716 & photo. reprint
1978). "And it seems agreed at this day, that if one who has committed a capital offense, become
non compos... after conviction.., he shall not be executed." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (1783 & photo. reprint 1978). "If, after he be tried and found
guilty .. .and he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed." Larkin, The Eighth
Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent. 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (1980).
"[I]t has been a cardinal principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence since the medieval period
that the presently incompetent should not be executed."
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the common law rule barring execution of the insane. First, a sane per-
son might be able to allege some facts or circumstances that should
stay his execution. 2' Second, insanity was thought to be punishment in
itself.80 Third, the practice is cruel and is no deterrent to others.31 Fi-
nally, there may be some religious justification for the rule."
The intent of the framers of the Bill of Rights was to ensure that
Americans had, at least, the rights of Englishmen at common law.33
This is so because the Bill of Rights was based directly on English
principles and values." In Solem v. Helm35 the United States Supreme
Court noted that there is convincing proof that the framers of the
eighth amendment, through their use of the language of the English
Bill of Rights,86 intended to provide at least the same protection for
Americans as the Englishmen had under the English Bill of Rights,"
which included the right not to be executed while insane.38
Many state courts adopted the English common law rule of stay-
ing execution of the insane. 89 In Ex parte Chester 0 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that if a trial judge has doubts concerning the sanity
of one who has been convicted and sentenced to death, the trial judge
29. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1847). Accord, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28,
at 24-25.
30. "[F]uriosus solo furore 'punitur.'" 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28 at 395-96. This
Latin phrase loosely translates to "madness is its own punishment." See Ford. 106 S. Ct. at 2601.
31. 3 E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1628 &
photo. reprint 1978).
32. Some writers have thought the rule to be based upon religion; it is inappropriate to send
an offender "into another world, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it." Ford, 106 S.
Ct. at 2601 (citing Hawles' Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, (1685) 11 How. St.
Tr. 474, 477 (1816)).
33. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3007 (1983) (citing I American Archives 700 (4th
series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774)). "[H]is Majesty's subjects in America ... are
entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-subjects in Great Britain."
34. "[T]he Bills of Rights, starting with Mason's in 1776, were the repository of English
values," and, "the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the other bills of rights which followed it,
were in good part 'restatements of English principles.'" A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNY-
MEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTIruTIONALISM IN AMERICA 206 (1968).
35. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
36. "The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of
rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the
English Bill of Rights. There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least
the liberties and privileges of English men. See A. Nivens, The American States During and After
the Revolution, 146 (1924)." 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3007 n.10 (1983).
37. 103 S. Ct. at 3007.
38. See supra note 28.
39. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 353, 157 N.E. 247, 258 (1927); Howie v. State,
121 Miss. 197, 216-18, 83 So. 158, 159-60 (1919); In re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 746-49, 178
N.W. 624, 625-26 (1920); In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 56-57, 176 P. 819, 822 (1918).
40. 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927).
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should inquire into the sanity of the convict to determine whether the
sentence should be carried out. 1
In Nobles v. Georgia42 the United States Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the application of a state prohibition against execution of an
insane person." The defendant was accused of murder, found guilty,
and sentenced to die by a Georgia state court." A Georgia statute pro-
vided that the insanity issue was to be determined by a jury inquest
conducted by and on the initiative of the warden or sheriff having cus-
tody of the defendant.4 The defendant argued that she had a due pro-
cess right to have the claim heard by a jury, 46 but the Court held that
a jury trial was not required .4After acknowledging the common law
rule barring execution of the insane," the Court reasoned that the state
must do no more than place responsibility on some appropriate official
to conduct an inquiry into the competency of the defendant when it
seems necessary. 9
The Supreme Court next addressed the issue in Phyle v. Duffy. 50
In that case a California state court sentenced the defendant to die for
first degree murder.' 1 The defendant argued that the California statu-
tory procedure'5 for determining sanity violated his due process
rights.'3 The United States Supreme Court indicated that the Nobles
decision did not necessarily require rejection of the defendant's due
process claim." The gravity and importance of the defendant's claim
was recognized by the Court;" however, the Court decided that the
defendant had not exhausted his state law remedy." Thus, the consti-
tutional question was not ripe for review.' 7
41. Id. at 594, 112 So. at 89.
42. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id. at 402.
46. 168 U.S. at 400.
47. Id. at 409.
48. Id. at 406.
49. Id. at 409.
50. 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
51. Id. at 432.
52. Id. at 434-37 nn.2-6 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700-04 (1941)).
53. 334 U.S. at 433-34.
54. Id. at 437.
55. Id. at 441.
56. Id. (defendant could have sought writ of mandamus to compel warden to initiate sanity
proceedings).
57. Id. at 444.
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In Solesbee v. Balkcom58 a Georgia state court sentenced the de-
fendant to the death penalty for murder. The defendant claimed to be
insane.59 Pursuant to the state procedure for determining insanity, the
Governor was entrusted with the responsibility of making the decision
on competency. "The defendant contended that the due process clause
guaranteed him a right to have his sanity determined by a judicial or
administrative tribunal after notice and a hearing in which he could
have counsel present, cross-examine witnesses, and offer evidence. 1
With only one justice dissenting, the Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention, holding that the mode of procedural determination of insanity
was a matter of grace, not of right,62 and that the state was thus under
no obligation to provide a hearing. 68
In Robinson v. California" the Supreme Court recognized that
the eighth amendment was applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment. 65
In Ford v. Wainwright" Justice Marshall spoke for the majority
and began by noting that the due process clause and the eighth amend-
ment have evolved substantially since the days of Solesbee v.
Balkcom.67 In order to test the adequacy of the state procedures for
determining sanity, the Court found it necessary to determine first
whether the Constitution places a substantive restriction on the state's
power to take the life of an insane prisoner."
The Court's historical analysis revealed that the eighth amend-
ment was meant to embrace everything that was considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. 9 In order to deter-
mine what was considered cruel and unusual at that time, Justice Mar-
shall turned to the common law. The Court noted that execution of the
insane was prohibited at the common law.70
The Court next examined the reasons for the common law rule
58. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (codified as amended at GA. CODE. ANN. §
17-10-61 (1982)).
61. 339 U.S. at 10.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 14.
64. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
65. Id. at 667.
66. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
67. Id. at 2599-2600 (citing Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 U.S. 9 (1950)).
68. 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2601.
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barring execution of the insane. One explanation was that execution of
the insane simply offends humanity.71 The Court discussed other expla-
nations 1' and concluded by noting that the reasons for the law may not
be clear and uniform, but it is clear that at common law, insane people
were not executed. 3
The Court then noted that no state permits execution of the in-
sane.7 4 This was evidence to the Court that the common law rule has as
firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in
England.75 The Court held that the restriction against execution of the
insane finds support in the eighth amendment whether the aim is "to
protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of under-
standing, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance .... ",76
Having thus concluded that the Constitution bars execution of the
insane, the Court next addressed the question of whether the Florida
procedure was adequate so as to preclude the need for an evidentiary
hearing in the district court.77
The Court began this inquiry by noting that in a habeas corpus
proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is required by the federal court un-
less the state court trier of fact has, after a full hearing, reliably found






75. Id. at 2602.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
79. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
80. 106 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977)). The statute provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State
or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opin-
ion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall
admit-
(I) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
1986-87]
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The Court then examined the statutory procedures required by
Florida law. The Court found that sanity must be determined with the
high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life of a human
being.81 The Florida law was deficient because it precluded Ford or his
counsel from presenting material relevant to the prisoner's sanity, de-
nied Ford the opportunity to challenge or impeach state-appointed psy-
chiatrists' opinions, and placed the decision wholly within the executive
branch.82
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed that the Constitu-
tion barred execution of the insane.88 He added that this is so only
when the execution is of those who cannot appreciate the punishment
they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Justice Powell
also believed that a full-scale sanity hearing should not be required,85
but nevertheless found that the claim of insanity was not adjudicated
fairly within the meaning of due process.8 6
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, concurred in the result
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly sup-
ported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of
such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the
circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is
shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless
the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the
record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such
factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convinc-
ing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977).
81. 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
82. Id. at 2604-05.
83. Id. at 2606 (Powell, J.. concurring).
84. Id. at 2609.
85. Id. at 2610.
86. Id. at 2611.
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in part, and dissented in part. Justice O'Connor believed that the
eighth amendment did not create a substantive right not to be executed
while insane.87 Her position was that Florida positive law created a pro-
tected liberty interest in avoiding execution while incompetent, and
that Florida did not provide even those minimum procedural protec-
tions required by due process in this area.8" Justice O'Connor would
have remanded to a state court to determine Ford's competency in a
manner that comported with due process.89
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. Jus-
tice Rehnquist did not believe that the eighth amendment created a
substantive right not to be executed while insane.90 He re-examined the
common law basis for the majority's eighth amendment proscription
and concluded that at common law, it was the executive who deter-
mined the sanity pursuant to a sentence of death.91 Thus, Justice Rehn-
quist did not believe that the majority was keeping faith with the com-
mon law heritage." He believed that wholly executive procedures could
comport with due process.938
The Supreme Court's decision in Ford is significant9" because the
Court has now found a right that had not been recognized in the two-
hundred-year history of our Constitution. Arguably, however, the
eighth amendment proscription was not needed to reach the Court's
holding. Justices O'Connor and White, who found that there was not
an eighth amendment right not to be executed while insane, would have
found for Ford anyway, because the Florida statute violated due pro-
cess. Presumably then, even if Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
87. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2612.
90. Id. at 2615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2613.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2615.
94. The significance of the case appears to extend beyond its effect upon convicted criminals
sentenced to die and the lawyers charged with representing such individuals. The Ford decision
received a large amount of attention in the press when announced. See PRESS, A. & McDANIEL,
A., A Supreme Court Stay of Death, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986 at 63; NATION, July 19-26, 1986,
at 37.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that "if petitioner is cured of his disease, the
State is free to execute him." 106 S. Ct. at 2610 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). This presents an
interesting conflict of interest for psychiatrists and other mental health workers. Should a psychia-
trist uphold his duty to his patient to relieve mental pain, confusion and anguish, when that relief
will result in the execution of his patient? An article on the Ford decision in Nation magazine
states, "Mental health workers are thus faced with the Kafkaesque dilemma of trying to help
someone become a functioning member of society so that he or she can be killed." NATION, AT 37.
1986-871
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and Stevens had not been able to gather a majority on the eighth
amendment issue, the result would have been the same, for they would
have at least found that the Florida statute violated due process.
The Supreme Court had already stated in Hewitt v. Helms95 that
protected liberty interests may arise from the laws of the States. No
member of the Supreme Court believed that the due process clause in-
dependently created a protected interest in avoiding execution while in-
sane. On this issue, Justice O'Connor believed that the laws of Florida
had entitled Ford to a protected liberty interest in avoiding execution
while insane." Apparently, for the majority, Justice O'Connor's rea-
soning merely begged the question of what happens to a prisoner when
the State has not created such a liberty interest.
It is precisely this contingency which made it necessary for the
majority to find that the United States Constitution prohibits execution
of the insane. In a situation in which a state has not created a pro-
tected liberty interest in avoiding execution while insane, the eighth
amendment will now prohibit such an execution. In finding such a con-
stitutional right, the majority mooted any questions concerning whether
a state has created such a protected liberty interest.
The Ford decision is also significant because it provides an escape
for some defendants who have been validly convicted and constitution-
ally sentenced to die. Placed in its historical context, the Ford decision
may be the most severe restriction posited upon the states in meting out
capital punishment.
Given the Court's attitude toward the arbitrary and capricious na-
ture of death penalties in Furman v. Georgia,97 and the limitations im-
posed by Woodson v. North Carolina,98 Roberts v. Louisiana,9" Coker
v. Georgia,100 and Enmund v. Florida,101 it may be that the Court has
no intention of expanding the applicability of the death penalty further.
In fact, a narrowing process may have begun. It is against this back-
ground that the significance of the Court's holding in Ford should be
viewed.
95. 459 U.S. 460, 469-71 (1983).
96. 106 S. Ct. at 2611.
97. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
98. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (death penalty unconstitutional when imposed mandatorily for first
degree murder which includes any murder committed in a felony).
99. 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (mandatory death penalty statute for murder of peace officer held
unconstitutional).
100. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (no death sentence for person convicted of rape).
101. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (no death penalty for person sentenced under the felony murder
rule when such person did not actually commit murder).
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The meaning of the decision in Gregg v. Georgia"'2 has never been
clear. It is clear, however, that under its holding the death penalty may
be constitutionally imposed in some situations.103 The task of the Su-
preme Court since Gregg has been to outline the parameters of the
constitutionality of the death penalty and to determine in which situa-
tions it may be imposed.
Ford is significant because, unlike the Supreme Court's most re-
cent limitations on capital punishment,'"s it deals with a situation
wherein a defendant may have actually committed a heinous murder
with his own hands.105 The Ford decision prevents the state from tak-
ing the life of a murderer if that murderer is found to be insane, even if
the murder was premeditated and the defendant who committed the
murder was completely sane at the time of the offense.
Given the state of mental health of many death row inmates, the
new Ford rule may grant a constitutional reprieve for many inmates.
While Justice Marshall may have lost in Gregg'° over the constitution-
ality of the death penalty, his analysis in Ford may have constitution-
ally pruned back the Court's previous holding in Gregg, and thus lim-
ited the applicability of the death penalty even further.
Jonathan Taylor
102. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
103. Id.
104. Enmund. 458 U.S. at 782; Coker, 433 U.S. at 584. See also supra notes 100-01.
105. "I have no remorse whatsoever. I'm extremely proud of knowing that I, Arthur Freder-
ick Goode, was the last person to see Jason alive or any of the other victims which 1 have mur-
dered. Also, that I was the last person who heard the sweet, sexy voice. I was also the last person
who had kissed his precious warm lips, before I, Arthur Goode, had murdered him. These are
some of the things I'm proud of. Jason was so cute and sexy-looking that I raped him while I beat
him with my belt. I didn't want anybody else to see Jason's beautiful body again before I, Arthur
Goode 3d, fucked him up. I'm ready right now to murder a little boy .... I would have the nerve
to murder a little boy right here in this courtroom, in front of this jury just to prove that I would
do such a thing, only if it was authorized by the Court, which I know it is not." SHERRILL, R., In
Florida, Insanity is no Defense, Nation- 553, Nov. 24, 1984. In Wainwright v. Goode, 464
U.S. 78 (1983), the United States Supreme Court upheld the penalty of death for the maker of
this statement. Presumably, under the Ford holding, such a defendant could not be executed if
determined to be insane.
106. 428 U.S. at 231. Justice Marshall dissented believing that the death penalty was not a
deterrent and had no retributive value. Id. at 241.
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